

Decidibilidad y Expresividad

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1 Undecidability and Expressiveness

2 Some usual extensions

- Equality
- Arithmetics

Soundness, Completeness and Undecidability

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- Still, some fragments of Predicate Calculus are known to be decidable.

Some decidable fragments of FOL


- **Monadic** predicate calculus (only 1-ary predicates)
- The class with prefix $\exists^*\forall^*$
- The class with prefix $\exists^*\forall\exists^*$
- The class with prefix $\exists^*\forall\forall\exists^*$ (no equality axioms)
- The class with two variables at most (Description Logics)
- **Guarded Predicate Calculus:**

$$\begin{aligned} & \exists \bar{y} (\alpha(\bar{x}, \bar{y}) \wedge \varphi(\bar{x}, \bar{y})) \\ & \forall \bar{y} (\alpha(\bar{x}, \bar{y}) \rightarrow \varphi(\bar{x}, \bar{y})) \end{aligned}$$

where α atomic and including all the free variables of φ .


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- Example: let G be a graph with vertices S and edges E . For instance S could represent states $\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3\}$ and E transitions among them like in:



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
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- Decision problem REACH (Graph reachability): given two vertices $u, v \in V$, can we find a finite path from u to v in G ?
- Since REACH is a decision problem, perhaps we can try to represent it as FOL-satisfiability of some formula $\varphi_{REACH}(u, v)$.

Expressiveness

- We use predicate $R(x, y)$ to represent edges and free variables u, v to represent the nodes to check.
- Given any graph G , we have its corresponding model $I(G)$. We look for a formula $\varphi_{REACH}(u, v)$ such that G has a finite path from u to v iff $I(G) \models \varphi_{REACH}(u, v)$.

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- Trying to encode reachability as a formula ...

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi_{REACH}(u, v) \stackrel{def}{=} & u = v \quad \vee \quad \exists x (R(u, x) \wedge R(x, v)) \\ & \vee \quad \exists x_1 \exists x_2 (R(u, x_1) \wedge R(x_1, x_2) \wedge R(x_2, v)) \\ & \vee \quad \dots\end{aligned}$$

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Can we find an equivalent well-founded formula? **NO**

Theorem

There is no FOL-formula $\varphi_{REACH}(u, v)$ depending on R, u, v such that there is a finite path from u to v in G iff $I(G) \models \varphi_{REACH}(u, v)$.

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- Two important properties:

Theorem (Compactness Theorem)

Let Γ be a set of sentences. If all finite subsets of Γ are satisfiable, then Γ is satisfiable.

Theorem (Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem)

If Γ has a model then it has a model with a countable domain.

Countable domain means: $|D| = |S|$ for some subset S of natural numbers (including the whole set too).

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FOL with equality

- $FOL_{=}$: We have an (infix) binary predicate '=' whose meaning is fixed by the axiom schemata:

$$x = x$$

$$x = y \rightarrow f(\bar{z}, x, \bar{z}') = f(\bar{z}, y, \bar{z}')$$

$$x = y \wedge \varphi(x) \rightarrow \varphi(y)$$

for any variables x, y , tuples of variables \bar{z}, \bar{z}' , function symbol f and any formula φ .

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- **Symmetry** and **transitivity** can be proved from the axioms above:

$$x = y \rightarrow y = x$$

$$x = y \wedge y = z \rightarrow x = z$$

Sequent Calculus with equality

$$\overline{\Gamma \vdash t = t} \quad (= R)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, s = t \vdash A[x/s]}{\Gamma, s = t \vdash A[x/t]} \quad (= L1)$$

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- Peano Arithmetics (PA) axioms: universal closure of

$$\begin{aligned}\neg(0 &= s(x)) \\ s(x) = s(y) &\rightarrow x = y \\ x + 0 &= x \\ x + s(y) &= s(x + y) \\ x \cdot 0 &= 0 \\ x \cdot s(y) &= x \cdot y + x\end{aligned}$$

plus the induction schema ...

Dedekind/Peano axioms

- **Induction schema**: contains a **countably infinite** set of axioms:

$$\forall \bar{y} (\varphi(0, \bar{y}) \wedge \\ \forall x (\varphi(x, \bar{y}) \rightarrow \varphi(s(x), \bar{y})) \\ \rightarrow \forall x \varphi(x, \bar{y}))$$

for **any formula** $\varphi(x, \bar{y})$ with free variables x and (tuple) \bar{y} .

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- Induction has a simpler encoding in second order logic:

$$\forall P (P(0) \wedge \forall x (P(x) \rightarrow P(s(x))) \rightarrow \forall x P(x))$$

Gödel's first incompleteness theorem



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- It follows that there are valid formulas that are *unprovable* (in fact, there are infinitely many of them).
- The theorem can also be stated as: for a recursive, consistent set of axioms for arithmetics there are sentences such that neither φ nor $\neg\varphi$ has a proof.