

Strongly equivalent temporal logic programs^{*}

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Abstract. This paper analyses the idea of strong equivalence for transition systems represented as logic programs under the Answer Set Programming (ASP) paradigm. To check strong equivalence, we use a linear temporal extension of Equilibrium Logic (a logical characterisation of ASP) and its monotonic basis, the intermediate logic of Here-and-There (HT). Trivially, equivalence in this temporal extension of HT provides a sufficient condition for temporal strong equivalence and, as we show in the paper, it can be transformed into a provability test into the standard Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), something that can be automatically checked using any of the LTL available provers. The paper shows an example of the potential utility of this method by detecting some redundant rules in a simple actions reasoning scenario.

1 Introduction

The paradigm of *Answer set programming* (ASP) [1, 2] (based on the *stable models* semantics [3]) constitutes one of the most successful examples of logical nonmonotonic formalisms applied to Knowledge Representation [4, 5] in Artificial Intelligence. Probably, the reasons for this success are both related to its powerful representational features and, at the same time, to the availability of an increasing number of efficient ASP solvers (see [6]) that allow its application to many real scenarios. Concerning the formalism properties, ASP is characterised by providing nonmonotonic reasoning with a rich and flexible syntax, initially born from logic programming, but continuously extended thereafter along the research history in the area, without overlooking its original semantic simplicity. An important breakthrough in this sense has been the logical characterisation of ASP in terms of *Equilibrium Logic* [7] that has opened, for instance, the study of strong equivalence [8] (the main topic of this paper) and has recently allowed the extension of the stable models semantics for arbitrary first order theories [9, 10].

As for the practical applications of ASP, perhaps one of the most outstanding and frequent uses has been the representation and automated reasoning for action domains, solving typical problems like prediction, explanation, planning

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or diagnostics. Default negation plays here a crucial role, as it allows representing the rule of *inertia* (that can be stated as “a fluent remains unchanged by default”) and avoid in this way the frame problem [11]. ASP can also be naturally used for solving other typical representational problems in Reasoning about Actions and Change, and is in fact the basis for a family of high level action languages [12]. The use of ASP solvers for action domains, however, has some limitations, as partly explained by the complexity class that these solvers allow to capture (Σ_2^P in the most general case). In practice, this means for instance that, when solving a planning problem (which lies in PSPACE-completeness) we must fix an *a priori* plan length so that a ground logic program can be eventually generated. The search for a minimal plan consists then in gradually incrementing this plan length until a stable model is found. A first obvious drawback of this approach is that it is not possible to establish when a given planning problem has *no solution* of any length at all. A second and more elaborated problem is that it is impossible to establish when two descriptions of the same transition system are *strongly equivalent*, i.e., when they will behave in the same way regardless any additional rules we include and any path length we consider.

As we mentioned above, the idea of *strong equivalence* was introduced in [8], where the following question was considered: when can we safely replace a piece of knowledge representation by an “equivalent” one independently of the context? Formally, we say that two logic programs Π_1 and Π_2 are *strongly equivalent* when, for any arbitrary logic program Π , both $\Pi_1 \cup \Pi$ and $\Pi_2 \cup \Pi$ have the same stable models. Note that, for a monotonic logic, this property trivially collapses to regular equivalence (i.e., coincidence of sets of models) of Π_1 and Π_2 . However, when a nonmonotonic entailment is involved, the addition of a set of rules Π may make different effects in the sets of stable models of Π_1 and Π_2 , so that strong equivalence is indeed an *stronger* property than regular equivalence. In [8] it was shown that two logic programs are strongly equivalent (under the stable models semantics) if and only if they are equivalent under the intermediate logic of *Here-and-There* [13], the monotonic basis of Equilibrium Logic.

In this paper we consider the study of strong equivalence for logic programs that represent transition systems. To this aim, we revisit a temporal extension of Equilibrium Logic proposed in [14] which consists in the inclusion of modal operators as those handled in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [15, 16]. This extension, called *Temporal Equilibrium Logic*, immediately provides us with a sufficient condition for strong equivalence of temporal logic programs: we can simply check regular equivalence in its monotonic basis, a logic we called *Temporal Here-and-There* (THT). The main contribution of the paper is the automation of this test for strong equivalence so that, using a similar translation to those presented in [17, 18, 10], we transform a THT formula into LTL and use an LTL prover afterwards – in particular, we runned our experiments on the *Logics Workbench* [19].

The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we introduce a simple motivating example, extracted from the Reasoning about Actions literature, to

show the kind of problems we are interested in, proposing a pair of strong equivalence tests in this domain. In Section 3 we revisit the syntax and semantics of *Temporal Here-and-There* (THT) and we propose afterwards a models selection criterion, to define the nonmonotonic *Temporal Equilibrium Logic* (TEL). Section 4 presents the translation from THT into LTL, whereas Section 5 applies this translation to answer the questions proposed in Section 3. Finally, Section 6 contains the conclusions and future work.

2 A simple motivating example

Consider the following simple and well-known scenario [20] from Reasoning about Actions literature.

Example 1. An electric circuit consists of a battery, two switches and a light bulb. The switches are serially connected, as shown in Figure 2. The system state is expressed in terms of three propositional fluents sw_1, sw_2 and $light$, whose negations are represented with a bar on top of each fluent symbol. The state of each switch sw_i can be alternated by performing a corresponding action $toggle_i$. \square




Fig. 1. A simple electric circuit.

For simplicity, we assume that we do not handle concurrent actions. A possible representation of this scenario as an ASP logic program, Π_1 , is shown below:

$$sw_j(I + 1) \leftarrow toggle_j(I), \overline{sw}_j(I) \quad (1)$$

$$\overline{sw}_j(I + 1) \leftarrow toggle_j(I), sw_j(I) \quad (2)$$

$$\overline{light}(I + 1) \leftarrow toggle_j(I), sw_j(I) \quad (3)$$

$$light(I + 1) \leftarrow toggle_1(I), \overline{sw}_1(I), sw_2(I) \quad (4)$$

$$light(I + 1) \leftarrow toggle_2(I), \overline{sw}_2(I), sw_1(I) \quad (5)$$

$$\perp \leftarrow toggle_1, toggle_2 \quad (6)$$

$$f(I + 1) \leftarrow f(I), not \overline{f}(I + 1) \quad (7)$$

$$\overline{f}(I + 1) \leftarrow \overline{f}(I), not f(I + 1) \quad (8)$$

$$\perp \leftarrow f(I), \overline{f}(I) \quad (9)$$

where $j \in \{1, 2\}$ and $f \in \{sw_1, sw_2, light\}$, and we assume that each symbol like \bar{f} is actually treated as a new predicate. Variable $I = 0 \dots n - 1$ represents an integer index for each situation in the temporal narrative. Rules (1)-(5) are the *effect axioms*, capturing all the direct effects of actions. Rule (6) just avoids performing concurrent actions. Rules (7),(8) represent the inertia default, for each fluent f . Finally, (9) expresses that each fluent f and its explicit negation \bar{f} cannot be simultaneously true.

As explained in the introduction, a planning problem would include additional facts (representing the initial state) and rules for generating actions and expressing a plan goal. But the most important additional step is deciding a finite limit n for variable I , so that the above program can be grounded.

Assume now that we want to modify Π_1 after noticing that the truth value of *light* is actually determined by the value of the two switches, becoming in this way an indirect effect or *ramification*¹. In other words, we consider now the addition of rules:

$$light \leftarrow sw_1, sw_2 \tag{10}$$

$$\bar{light} \leftarrow \bar{sw}_1 \tag{11}$$

$$\bar{light} \leftarrow \bar{sw}_2 \tag{12}$$

If we call $\Pi_2 = \Pi_1 \cup \{(10) - (12)\}$, we may reasonably propose the following questions:

- (Q1) Can we safely remove now from Π_2 the effect axioms for fluent *light* (3)-(5)?
- (Q2) Assume we removed (3)-(5). Since *light* is “defined” now in terms of sw_1 and sw_2 , can we safely remove from Π_2 the inertia rules for *light*?

In order to answer these questions, the current tools for testing strong equivalence for ground programs [21, 22] cannot provide successful answers in an automated way, as they *need* previously fixing a numeric value for the path length n .

3 Linear Temporal Here-and-There (THT)

We proceed now to recall the main definitions of the temporal extension of Equilibrium Logic, beginning with its monotonic basis. The logic of *Linear Temporal Here-and-There* (THT) is defined as follows. We start from a finite set of atoms Σ called the *propositional signature*. A (temporal) *formula* is defined as any combination of the atoms in Σ with the classical connectives $\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \perp$, the (unary) temporal operators \Box (to be read as “always” or “from now on”), \Diamond (“eventually”), \circ (“next”) and the (binary) temporal operators \mathcal{U} (“until”), \mathcal{W} (“weak until”) and \mathcal{B} (“before”). Negation is defined as $\neg\varphi \stackrel{def}{=} \varphi \rightarrow \perp$

¹ In fact, this example were used in [20] to illustrate possible representational problems for a suitable treatment of action ramifications.

whereas $\top \stackrel{def}{=} \neg\perp$. As usual, $\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi$ stands for $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$. We also allow the abbreviation $\bigcirc^i \varphi \stackrel{def}{=} \bigcirc(\bigcirc^{i-1} \varphi)$ for $i > 0$ and $\bigcirc^0 \varphi \stackrel{def}{=} \varphi$.

A (temporal) *interpretation* M is an infinite sequence of pairs $\langle H_i, T_i \rangle$ with $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ where $H_i \subseteq T_i$ are sets of atoms. For simplicity, given a temporal interpretation, we write \overline{H} (resp. \overline{T}) to denote the sequence of pair components H_0, H_1, \dots (resp. T_0, T_1, \dots). Using this notation, we will sometimes abbreviate the interpretation as $M = \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle$. An interpretation $M = \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle$ is said to be total when $\overline{H} = \overline{T}$. We say that an interpretation $M = \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle$ satisfies a formula φ at some sequence index i , written $M, i \models \varphi$, when any of the following hold:

1. $M, i \models p$ if $p \in H_i$, for any atom p .
2. $M, i \models \varphi \wedge \psi$ if $M, i \models \varphi$ and $M, i \models \psi$.
3. $M, i \models \varphi \vee \psi$ if $M, i \models \varphi$ or $M, i \models \psi$.
4. $\langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ if $\langle X, \overline{T} \rangle, i \not\models \varphi$ or $\langle X, \overline{T} \rangle \models \psi$ for all $X \in \{\overline{H}, \overline{T}\}$.
5. $M, i \models \bigcirc \varphi$ if $M, i+1 \models \varphi$.
6. $M, i \models \Box \varphi$ if for all $j \geq i$, $M, j \models \varphi$.
7. $M, i \models \Diamond \varphi$ if there exists some $j \geq i$, $M, j \models \varphi$.
8. $M, i \models \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$ if there exists $j \geq i$, $M, j \models \psi$ and $M, k \models \varphi$ for all k such that $i \leq k < j$.
9. $M, i \models \varphi \mathcal{W} \psi$ if either $M, i \models \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi$ or, for all $j \geq i$, $M, j \models \varphi$.
10. $M, i \models \varphi \mathcal{B} \psi$ if for all $j \geq i$, either $M, j \models \psi$ or there exists some k , $i \leq k < j$ such that $M, k \models \varphi$.

We assume that a finite sequence $\langle H_0, T_0 \rangle \dots \langle H_n, T_n \rangle$ with $n \geq 0$ is an abbreviation of the infinite sequence $\langle \overline{H}', \overline{T}' \rangle$ with $H'_i = H_i$, $T'_i = T_i$ for $i = 0, \dots, n$ and $H'_i = H_n$, $T'_i = T_n$ for $i > n$.

The logic of THT is an orthogonal combination of the logic of HT and the (standard) linear temporal logic (LTL) [16]. When we restrict temporal interpretations to finite sequences of length 1, that is $\langle H_0, T_0 \rangle$ and disregard temporal operators, we obtain the logic of HT. On the other hand, if we restrict the semantics to total interpretations, $\langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \varphi$ corresponds to satisfaction of formulas $\overline{T}, i \models \varphi$ in LTL.

A *theory* is any set of formulas. An interpretation M is a *model* of a theory Γ , written $M \models \Gamma$, if $M, 0 \models \alpha$, for each formula $\alpha \in \Gamma$. A formula φ is *valid* if $M, 0 \models \varphi$ for any M . The following are valid formulas in THT (and in LTL

too):

$$\diamond\varphi \leftrightarrow \top \mathcal{U} \varphi \quad (13)$$

$$\square\varphi \leftrightarrow \perp \mathcal{B} \varphi \quad (14)$$

$$\varphi \mathcal{W} \psi \leftrightarrow \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \vee \square\varphi \quad (15)$$

$$\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \leftrightarrow \varphi \mathcal{W} \psi \wedge \diamond\psi \quad (16)$$

$$\neg(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi) \leftrightarrow \neg\varphi \mathcal{B} \neg\psi \quad (17)$$

$$\neg(\varphi \mathcal{B} \psi) \leftrightarrow \neg\varphi \mathcal{U} \neg\psi \quad (18)$$

$$\neg\square\varphi \leftrightarrow \diamond\neg\varphi \quad (19)$$

$$\neg\diamond\varphi \leftrightarrow \square\neg\varphi \quad (20)$$

$$\bigcirc\neg\varphi \leftrightarrow \neg\bigcirc\varphi \quad (21)$$

$$\bigcirc(\varphi \wedge \psi) \leftrightarrow \bigcirc\varphi \wedge \bigcirc\psi \quad (22)$$

$$\bigcirc(\varphi \vee \psi) \leftrightarrow \bigcirc\varphi \vee \bigcirc\psi \quad (23)$$

$$\bigcirc(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \leftrightarrow (\bigcirc\varphi \rightarrow \bigcirc\psi) \quad (24)$$

$$\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \leftrightarrow \psi \vee (\varphi \wedge \bigcirc(\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi)) \quad (25)$$

$$\varphi \mathcal{B} \psi \leftrightarrow \psi \wedge (\varphi \vee \bigcirc(\varphi \mathcal{B} \psi)) \quad (26)$$

Theorems (13)-(15) allow defining \square , \diamond and \mathcal{W} in terms of \mathcal{U} and \mathcal{B} . The formulas (17) and (18) correspond to the De Morgan axioms between operators \mathcal{U} and \mathcal{B} . It is easy to see that, together with (13) and (14) they directly imply the corresponding De Morgan axioms (19) and (20) for \square and \diamond . An important difference with respect to LTL is that, when using these De Morgan axioms, some care must be taken if double negation is involved. For instance, by (19), the formula $\neg\diamond\neg\varphi$ is equivalent to $\neg\neg\square\varphi$, but this is not in general equivalent to $\square\varphi$. A simple counterexample is the interpretation $\langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle$ with all $T_i = \{p\}$ but some $H_j = \emptyset$, as it satisfies $\neg\neg\square p$ but not $\square p$. As a result, we cannot further define \mathcal{B} (resp. \square) in terms of \mathcal{U} (resp. \diamond) or vice versa, as happens in LTL. We have included other LTL standard properties like (21)-(24) to show that the “shifting” behaviour of \bigcirc with respect to classical connectives is the same as in LTL, or (25) and (26) that represent the inductive propagation of \mathcal{U} and \mathcal{B} respectively.

The *(Linear) Temporal Equilibrium Logic* (TEL) is a nonmonotonic version of THT where we establish a models selection criterion. Given two interpretations $M = \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle$ and $M' = \langle \overline{H}', \overline{T}' \rangle$ we say that M is *lower than* M' , written $M \leq M'$, when $\overline{T} = \overline{T}'$ and for all $i \geq 0$, $H_i \subseteq H'_i$. As usual, $M < M'$ stands for $M \leq M'$ but $M \neq M'$.

Definition 1 (Temporal Equilibrium Model). *An interpretation M is a temporal equilibrium model of a theory Γ if M is a total model of Γ and there is no other model $M' < M$ of Γ . \square*

Note that any temporal equilibrium model is total, that is, it has the form $\langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle$ and so can be actually seen as an interpretation \overline{T} in the standard LTL.

Example 2. The temporal equilibrium models of theory $\{\diamond p\}$ are captured by the LTL models of the formula $\alpha := \neg p \mathcal{U} (p \wedge \bigcirc \neg p)$.

Proof. Note first that it is easy to check that LTL models of α correspond to interpretations following the pattern $[\emptyset]^* \{p\} [\emptyset]^*$. Now, take any a total interpretation $M = \langle \bar{T}, \bar{T} \rangle$ with some $T_i = \{p\}$. Clearly, $M, 0 \models \diamond p$, but its minimality will depend on whether there exists another $j \neq i$ with $T_j = \{p\}$ in \bar{T} . Assume there exists such a j : then it is easy to see that the interpretation $\{\bar{H}, \bar{T}\}$ with $H_j = \emptyset$ and $\bar{H}_k = \bar{T}_k$ for $k \neq j$ is also a model of $\diamond p$ (since $H_i = T_i = \{p\}$) whereas it is strictly lower, so it would not be a temporal equilibrium model. Assume, on the contrary, that T_i is the unique state containing p , so $T_k = \emptyset$ for all $k \neq i$. Then, the only possible smaller interpretation would be $\{\bar{H}, \bar{T}\}$ with $H_k = T_k = \emptyset$ for $k \neq i$ and $H_i = \emptyset$, but this is not a THT model of $\diamond p$, as p would not occur in \bar{H} . \square

Example 3. Consider the theory Γ just consisting of the formula $\square(\neg p \rightarrow \bigcirc p)$. Its temporal equilibrium models are captured by the LTL models of $\alpha := \neg p \wedge \square(\neg p \leftrightarrow \bigcirc p)$.

Proof. Again, note first that the LTL models of α have the form $\emptyset [\{p\} \emptyset]^+$. Now, for an informal sketch, note that any solution with p true at T_0 will not be minimal. Once $\neg p$ is fixed at the initial state, we must get p at T_1 to satisfy the formula. Then p true at T_2 would not be minimal, so it must be false, and so on. \square

Proposition 1. *Let Γ be a combination of non-modal connectives $\wedge, \vee, \neg, \rightarrow, \perp$ with expressions like $\bigcirc^i p$, being p an atom, and let n be the maximum value for i in all $\bigcirc^i p$ occurring in Γ . Then $\langle \bar{T}, \bar{T} \rangle$ is a temporal equilibrium model of Γ iff (1) $T_i = \emptyset$ for all $i > n$; and (2) $\langle X, X \rangle$ with $X = \bigcup_{i=0}^n \{\bigcirc^i p \mid p \in T_i\}$ is an equilibrium model of Γ , reading each ' $\bigcirc^i p$ ' as a new atom in the signature. \square*

That is, once $\square, \diamond, \mathcal{U}$ and \mathcal{W} are removed, we can reduce TEL to (non-temporal) Equilibrium Logic for an extended signature with atoms like $\bigcirc^i p$.

In [14] it was shown as an example how TEL can be used to encode in a straightforward way the action language \mathcal{B} [12].

An important observation is that proving the equivalence of two temporal theories in THT is a trivial sufficient condition for their strong equivalence under TEL – if they have the same THT models, they will always lead to the same set of temporal equilibrium models, regardless the context. The next section shows how this THT equivalence test can be transformed into provability in standard LTL.

4 Translating THT into LTL

Given a propositional signature Σ , let us denote $\Sigma^* = \Sigma \cup \{p' \mid p \in \Sigma\}$ which is going to be the new propositional signature in LTL. For any temporal formula φ we define its translation φ^* as follows:

1. $\perp^* \stackrel{def}{=} \perp$
2. $p^* \stackrel{def}{=} p'$ for any $p \in \Sigma$
3. $(\odot\varphi)^* \stackrel{def}{=} \odot\varphi^*$, if $\odot \in \{\square, \diamond, \bigcirc\}$
4. $(\varphi \odot \psi)^* \stackrel{def}{=} \varphi^* \odot \psi^*$, when $\odot \in \{\wedge, \vee, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{B}\}$
5. $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)^* \stackrel{def}{=} (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\varphi^* \rightarrow \psi^*)$

From the last point and the fact that $\neg\varphi = \varphi \rightarrow \perp$, it follows that $(\neg\varphi)^* = (\varphi \rightarrow \perp) \wedge (\varphi^* \rightarrow \perp) = \neg\varphi \wedge \neg\varphi^*$. Similarly, $(\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi)^* = (\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi) \wedge (\varphi^* \leftrightarrow \psi^*)$.

We associate to any THT interpretation $M = \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle$ the LTL interpretation $M^t = \overline{T}$ in LTL defined as the sequence of sets of atoms $I_i = \{p' \mid p \in H_i\} \cup T_i$, for any $i \geq 0$. Informally speaking, M^t considers a new primed atom p' per each one in the original signature $p \in \Sigma$. In the LTL interpretation, the primed atom p' represents the fact that p occurs at some point in the \overline{H} component, whereas the original symbol p is used to represent an atom in \overline{T} . As a THT interpretation must satisfy $H_i \subseteq T_i$ by construction, we may have LTL interpretations that do not correspond to any THT one. In particular, for an arbitrary \overline{T} , we will only be able to form some M such that $M^t = \overline{T}$ when the set of primed atoms at each I_i is a subset of the non-primed ones. In other words, only LTL interpretations \overline{T} satisfying the axiom:

$$\square(p' \rightarrow p) \tag{27}$$

will have a corresponding THT interpretation M such that $\overline{T} = M^t$.

Example 4. $M = ((\emptyset, \{p, q\}), (\{p\}, \{p, q\}), (\{q\}, \{q\}))$ is a model of the theory $\{\square(\neg p \rightarrow q) \wedge \diamond q\}$. In the same way, the corresponding interpretation $M^t = (\{p, q\}, \{p', p, q\}, \{q', q\})$ is a model of

$$\begin{aligned} (\square(\neg p \rightarrow q) \wedge \diamond q)^* & \leftrightarrow \square(\neg p \rightarrow q)^* \wedge (\diamond q)^* & \leftrightarrow \\ \square((\neg p \rightarrow q) \wedge ((\neg p)^* \rightarrow q')) \wedge \diamond q' & \leftrightarrow \square((\neg p \rightarrow q) \wedge (\neg p \rightarrow q')) \wedge \diamond q'. \end{aligned}$$

In general:

Theorem 1. *Let $M = \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle$ be any THT interpretation and φ any formula. For any $i \geq 0$, it holds that*

- (a) $\langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \varphi$ if and only if $M^t, i \models \varphi^*$ in LTL; and
- (b) $\langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \varphi$ if and only if $M^t, i \models \varphi$ in LTL.

Proof. We proceed by induction. For the base case, it trivially holds for \perp whereas for an atom p , we have these equivalence chains

- (a) $(\langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models p) \Leftrightarrow (p \in H_i) \Leftrightarrow (p' \in I_i) \Leftrightarrow (M^t, i \models p')$.
- (b) $(\langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models p) \Leftrightarrow (p \in T_i) \Leftrightarrow (p \in I_i) \Leftrightarrow (M^t, i \models p)$

For the inductive step, we detail the proof for the classical connective \rightarrow , the (unary) temporal operator \bigcirc and the (binary) temporal operator \mathcal{U} . For the classical connectives \wedge and \vee the proof is straightforward; for connective \mathcal{B} , it is completely analogous to that for \mathcal{U} ; and finally, the rest of connectives can be defined in terms of the previous ones.

1. To prove (a) for the implication we have the chain of equivalent conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \varphi \rightarrow \psi &\stackrel{def}{\iff} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \not\models \varphi \text{ or } \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \psi \\ \text{and} \\ \langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \not\models \varphi \text{ or } \langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \psi \end{array} \right\} \stackrel{ind}{\iff} \\ &\left\{ \begin{array}{l} M^t, i \not\models \varphi^* \text{ or } M^t, i \models \psi^* \\ \text{and} \\ M^t, i \not\models \varphi \text{ or } M^t, i \models \psi \end{array} \right\} \iff \left\{ \begin{array}{l} M^t, i \models (\varphi^* \rightarrow \psi^*) \\ \text{and} \\ M^t, i \models (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \end{array} \right\} \stackrel{def}{\iff} \\ &M^t, i \models (\varphi \rightarrow \psi)^* \end{aligned}$$

For proving (b) it suffices with considering, in each of the three pairs of conjunctive conditions above, only the second conjunct.

2. For operator \bigcirc , note that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(a)} \quad \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \bigcirc \varphi &\stackrel{def}{\iff} \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i+1 \models \varphi \stackrel{ind}{\iff} M^t, i+1 \models \varphi^* \stackrel{def}{\iff} \\ &M^t, i \models \bigcirc \varphi^* \\ \text{(b)} \quad \langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \bigcirc \varphi &\stackrel{def}{\iff} \langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle, i+1 \models \varphi \stackrel{ind}{\iff} M^t, i+1 \models \varphi \stackrel{def}{\iff} \\ &M^t, i \models \bigcirc \varphi \end{aligned}$$

3. Finally, for \mathcal{U} it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(a)} \quad \langle \overline{H}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi &\stackrel{def}{\iff} \\ &\exists j \geq i, (M, j \models \psi) \text{ and } \forall k \text{ s.t. } i \leq k < j, (M, k \models \varphi) \stackrel{ind}{\iff} \\ &\exists j \geq i, (M^t, j \models \psi^*) \text{ and } \forall k \text{ s.t. } i \leq k < j, (M, k \models \varphi^*) \stackrel{def}{\iff} \\ &M^t, i \models \varphi^* \mathcal{U} \psi^* \stackrel{def}{\iff} M^t, i \models (\varphi \mathcal{U} \psi)^* \\ \text{(b)} \quad \langle \overline{T}, \overline{T} \rangle, i \models \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi &\stackrel{def}{\iff} \\ &\exists j \geq i, (M, j \models \psi) \text{ and } \forall k \text{ s.t. } i \leq k < j, (M, k \models \varphi) \stackrel{ind}{\iff} \\ &\exists j \geq i, (M^t, j \models \psi) \text{ and } \forall k \text{ s.t. } i \leq k < j, (M, k \models \varphi) \stackrel{def}{\iff} \\ &M^t, i \models \varphi \mathcal{U} \psi \end{aligned} \quad \square$$

Theorem 2 (Main theorem). *Let Γ_1 and Γ_2 be a pair of temporal theories, and $\bigwedge \Gamma_1$ and $\bigwedge \Gamma_2$ the conjunctions of their respective sets of formulas. Then Γ_1 and Γ_2 are strongly equivalent with respect to temporal equilibrium models if the formula (27) $\rightarrow (\bigwedge \Gamma_1 \leftrightarrow \bigwedge \Gamma_2)^*$ is valid in LTL.*

Proof. Once (27) is fixed as hypothesis, Theorem 1 allows us to establish a one to one correspondence between models of $\bigwedge \Gamma_1 \leftrightarrow \bigwedge \Gamma_2$ in THT and models of $(\bigwedge \Gamma_1 \leftrightarrow \bigwedge \Gamma_2)^*$ in LTL. Thus, if $(\bigwedge \Gamma_1 \leftrightarrow \bigwedge \Gamma_2)^*$ is LTL valid, this means that $\bigwedge \Gamma_1$ and $\bigwedge \Gamma_2$ are THT-equivalent, which is a sufficient condition for strong equivalence in TEL. \square

As we will show in the next section, we may also use this result to detect a redundant formula φ in some theory Γ . To this aim, we would have to show that Γ and $\Gamma' = \Gamma \setminus \{\varphi\}$ are strongly equivalent. From the theorem above, it follows that:

Corollary 1. *Let Γ be a temporal theory, $\bigwedge \Gamma$ the conjunction of its formulas and φ some arbitrary temporal formula. Then Γ and $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ are strongly equivalent if the formula $(27) \rightarrow (\bigwedge \Gamma \rightarrow \varphi)^*$ is valid in LTL. \square*

5 Back to the example

When representing now Example 1 in TEL, the encoding is quite obvious. As happens in Equilibrium Logic, the logic programming notation is directly replaced by a logical syntax, so that the rule arrow ‘ \leftarrow ’, the comma ‘ $,$ ’ and the default negation ‘*not*’ respectively represent standard implication, conjunction and negation. On the other hand, in order to capture the transition rules of program II_1 , only a small subset of the linear temporal syntax is actually required. All the rules depending on the temporal (universally quantified) variable I will be scoped now by a \square operator, whereas the atoms with argument $I + 1$ will be further preceded by a \bigcirc connective. As a result, we obtain the theory Γ_1 consisting of the formulas:

$$\square(\text{toggle}_j \wedge \overline{sw}_j \rightarrow \bigcirc sw_j) \quad (28)$$

$$\square(\text{toggle}_j \wedge sw_j \rightarrow \bigcirc \overline{sw}_j) \quad (29)$$

$$\square(\text{toggle}_j \wedge sw_j \rightarrow \bigcirc \overline{\text{light}}) \quad (30)$$

$$\square(\text{toggle}_1 \wedge \overline{sw}_1 \wedge sw_2 \rightarrow \bigcirc \text{light}) \quad (31)$$

$$\square(\text{toggle}_2 \wedge \overline{sw}_2 \wedge sw_1 \rightarrow \bigcirc \text{light}) \quad (32)$$

$$\square(\text{toggle}_1 \wedge \text{toggle}_2 \rightarrow \perp) \quad (33)$$

$$\square(f \wedge \neg \bigcirc \overline{f} \rightarrow \bigcirc f) \quad (34)$$

$$\square(\overline{f} \wedge \neg \bigcirc f \rightarrow \bigcirc \overline{f}) \quad (35)$$

$$\square(f \wedge \overline{f} \rightarrow \perp) \quad (36)$$

that respectively correspond to the rules (1)-(9).

In order to answer questions Q1 and Q2 proposed in Section 2, we have implemented the φ^* translation² and feeded the LWB linear temporal logic module with the resulting formulas extracted from Corollary 1 to detect redundant rules. In particular, regarding question Q1, we have been able to prove that, given the theory Γ_2 consisting of Γ_1 plus:

$$\square(sw_1 \wedge sw_2 \rightarrow \text{light}) \quad (37)$$

$$\square(\overline{sw}_1 \rightarrow \overline{\text{light}}) \quad (38)$$

$$\square(\overline{sw}_2 \rightarrow \overline{\text{light}}) \quad (39)$$

(that captures *light* as an indirect effect) then rule (30), that specified when *light* became off depending on each *toggle_j*, becomes redundant and can be

² Available at <http://www.dc.fi.udc.es/~cabalar/eqwb.html>

safely removed from Γ_2 . In fact, we could prove that (30) just followed from the formulas (29), (38) and (39).

However, when we consider the effect axioms (31),(32) we used to specify when the *light* becomes on, our checker just provides a negative answer. Since we are just dealing with a sufficient condition for strong equivalence, this does not provide any concluding information about Q1 for these rules. Fortunately, in this case it is not difficult to see that, in fact, these rules cannot be removed in any context without changing the general behaviour of the program. To see why, just think about adding, as a new effect of *toggle*₁, that switch *sw*₂ is disconnected:

$$\Box(\text{toggle}_1 \wedge \text{sw}_2 \rightarrow \overline{\text{sw}_2})$$

The addition of this new rule would clearly make a different effect depending on (31) is present in the theory or not. In particular, when we perform *toggle*₁ in a situation in which $\overline{\text{sw}_1} \wedge \text{sw}_2$, if we do not have (31) the light will just remain off, whereas if this formula is included, we will get no equilibrium model.

In order to answer question Q2, we considered theory $\Gamma_3 = \Gamma_2 \setminus \{(3)-(5)\}$ and tried to see whether (34),(35) were redundant, for the case $f = \text{light}$. Although it could seem that *light* value is “defined” in terms of *sw*₁ and *sw*₂ by rules (37)-(39), we actually obtained a negative answer, so no conclusion is obtained. It is easy to see that, in this case, we can find situations in which removing inertia may cause different effects depending on the context. For instance, if we had *light* and do not provide information for *sw*₁ and *sw*₂ or their explicit negations in a given state, the inertia would maintain *light* in the next situation (toggling yields no effect). If we remove inertia, however, neither *light* or $\overline{\text{light}}$ would hold in the next state.

If we look for a stronger relation between *light* and *sw*₁, *sw*₂ we can move to consider Γ_3 , consisting of Γ_2 and the rules:

$$\begin{aligned} &\Box(\text{light} \rightarrow \text{sw}_1) \\ &\Box(\text{light} \rightarrow \text{sw}_2) \\ &\Box(\overline{\text{light}} \rightarrow \overline{\text{light}}) \end{aligned}$$

we finally obtain that inertia (34),(35) for $f = \text{light}$ is redundant. The explanation for this is simple – note that these rules, together with (37) allow concluding (among other things) that :

$$\Box(\text{light} \leftrightarrow \text{sw}_1 \wedge \text{sw}_2)$$

which is a double implication, actually defining *light* as the conjunction of *sw*₁ and *sw*₂ in any situation.

6 Conclusions

In this paper we have studied the problem of strong equivalence of logic programs that represent transition systems. To this aim, we have incorporated to

logic programs the set of modal operators typically used in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). We provided a general semantics for any arbitrary (propositional) temporal theory, by proposing a temporal extension of Equilibrium Logic [7] (a logical characterisation of stable models) and its monotonic basis, the logic of Here-and-There (HT). As a result, we obtained a sufficient condition for checking strong equivalence of temporal logic programs, and we implemented a method for reducing this condition to provability in standard LTL. The advantage of this process is that, to the best of our knowledge, it constitutes the first automated tool for guaranteeing strong equivalence of logic programs representing transition systems, as the previous existing checkers always require fixing a numerical path length to obtain a ground program.

Of course, the main current drawback of this method is that, when the implemented test provides a negative answer, no conclusion can be drawn, since we have not proved yet whether it also constitutes a necessary condition for strong equivalence, something that was obtained [8] for the non-modal case with HT-equivalence. The desirable situation would be, instead, that a negative answer came with a counterexample, that is, a piece of (temporal) program that added to the original ones to be tested yields different effects in each case. This point is left for the immediate future work.

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